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REPORT OF AUDIT 
AID .WAN NO. 489-H-033 
TO THE GOVERNMZNT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
KOmA EJJCTRIC COMPANY 
FOR SEOUL THERMAL POWER PLANT 
For the Period from February 5, 1966 to February 28, 1969 
SCOPE OF AUDIT 
We have performed an interim audit of AID Loan No. 489-H-033 to the 
Government of the Republic of Korea (RoKG) and the Korea Electric Company 
(KEcO), The purpose of the loan was to provide financing of the U.S, dollar 
cost of services, including engineering services, and commodities related to 
the construction of a 137.5 megawatt (MW) thermal power plant. Our examina- 
tion covered the period from the date of the loan, February 5, 1966, through 
February 28, 1969. 
The purpose of this audit was to (1) determine compliance with appli- 
cable laws and AID regulations, the Loan Agreement and related documents; 
(2) review procurement and arrival accounting procedures and utilization of 
commodities; and (3) identify and report on any procedures that may affect 
or have adversely affected the timely implementation and completion of the 
project . 
Our examination was performed in accordance with the audit guidelines 
established in AID Manual Order 794.1, Audit of Capital Assistance, and 
included such other auditing procedures and tests of the accounting records 
as we considered necessary. 
This report is limited to a discussion of only those areas we found to 
be deficient or possible problem areaa. It does not include narrative on 
the various provisions of the ban Agreement and related documents that were 
satisfactorily complied with or the detailed audit procedures related thereto, 
BACKGROUND 
The Seoul Thermal Power Plant was the first power project undertaken by 
KECO following the formulation by KECO and the J.B. Thomas Power Survey Team 
(PsT) of long-range plans for the development of .Korea's power system, commonly 
known as Plan @R. The PST Report completed in October, 1965, recommended the 
construction of a 125 megawatt (MW) thermal generating unit to be completed in 
late 1968. This recommendation coincided with and supported the feasibility 
report  prepared by Gilbert  Associates, 1r.c. (GAI) submitted t o  KECO i n  August, 
1965. The GAI  report  recommended the construction of a l25MW plant (capacity 
subsequently changed t o  a guaranteed continuous output of 137.5MW. See page 6 )  
t o  be located a t  Dukso, an area approximataly 20 kilometers eas t  of Seoul 
( s i t e  area subsequently changed t o  Tangin-ri, an area on the  western outsk i r t s  
of Seoul. Sec?r..page 5) .  This project was assigned a high pr ior i ty  both by 
ROKG and the  USAID on the basis  tha t  there would be an estimated deficiency 
of.generating capacity i n  the  Seoul area of approximately lOOMW by the  end of 
1968. The or ig ina l  cost of t h i s  project was estimated a t  $29.7 mill ion of 
whtch R . 6  mil l ion i n  won equivalent was t o  be furnished by KECO and t h e  ROKG 
t o  cover loca l  comodity procurement and construction expenses. 
The loan agreement, signed on February 5, 1966, provided f o r  A I D  t o  loan 
the ROKG $22.5 million. The ROKG, in  turn,  was t o  loan the  en t i r e  amount t o  
KECO, t he  beneficiary. The loan agreement provided f o r  the  ROKG t o  repay the  
pr incipal  t o  A I D  i n  6 1  equal installments; t he  first installment t o  be due 
and payable -9 ryea r s  a f t e r  t he  f i r s t  i n t e re s t  payment is  due, o r  May 19, 1977. 
In t e res t  on unpaid principal, or* any unpaid in t e res t ,  accrues at the  r a t e  of 
l$ per amum f o r  10 years a f t e r  t h e  first disbursement, and a t  t h e  r a t e  of 
2 9  per annum thereaf ter .  
The sub-loan agreement betweon ROKG and KECO was entered i ~ t o  n July 29, 
1966 embodying the  terms and conditions s e t  fo r th  i n  the  or ig ina l  loan agree- 
ment. The l a t t e r  agreemeat provides f o r  KECO t o  r e p y  the principal t o  the  
ROKG i n  l o c a l  currency i n  32 ;qua1 :'~nstallments within 20 years from the date 
of the  f i r s t  disbursement-.including a! four year grace period. In t e res t  accrues 
a t  the  r a t e  of 5 3/48 per ann~sm ard is  payable semi-annually, with the  f i r s t  
payl~sat due and payable six months a f t e r  t he  f i r s t  disbursement. 
The present corporate s t ructure of KECO was created on July 1, 1961, by 
the merger of three  u t i l i t y  corporations then i n  existence i n  Korea, The 
purpose of this merger was t o  expedite the  development of e l e c t r i c  power and 
t o  improve the  effectiveness of management, by consolidation, of the  e l ec t r i -  
c a l  power u t i l i t i e s  i n  the  country. Control of KECO i s  vested i n  the ROKG 
through the ownership of approximately 52% of the  outstanding shares of stock. 
The remaining outstanding shares a re  Leld by corporate e n t i t i e s  and individuals. 
KECO'a physical f a c i l i t i e s  include a main of f ice  located i n  Seoul, 22 
power plant s i t e s ,  and f i f t e e n  branch of f ices  ,throughout Korea. An employees1 
t ra in ing  center, hospital ,  and e l e c t r i c  laboratory a r e  located i n  Seoul. 
KECO is the  sole  supplier of e l e c t r i c a l  power t o  Korea. A s  of February 
28, 1969 the  t o t a l  generating capacity of KECO was approximately 1,629MW. 
KECO currently has a s t a f f  of approximately 12,000 employees and provides 
e l e c t r i c a l  service t o  approximately 1.6 mill ion customers. 
Since 1954, U.S. do l l a r  assis tance directed toward the expansion of power 
generation and d is t r ibut ion .  i n  Korea has amounted t o  $157.0 mill ion of which 
$93.2 mill ion was i n  the form of development loan assistance and $63.8 million 
was grant askistance. I n  addition, counterpart funds released t o  KECO since 
1954 to ta led  Won 2.5 b i l l i o n  i n  grants (dol la r  equivalent of $8.9 mill ion) 
and Won 8.1 b i l l i o n  (dol lar  equivalent of $28.8 mill ion) i n  loans repayable 
t o  the Yiorea Reconstruction B.mk (KRB). 
TJSAID respons ib i l i t ies  fo r  administering the  loan and f o r  t h e  project 
supervision are  borne by the  Assistant ~irector/~evelorpment h a n s  ( ~ [ D L )  
and the  Industry-Engineering Division (IED) within t h e i r  respective f i e l d s  
of coupetence. The r e s p n s i b i l f t i e s  of the  ROKG have been assigned t o  the 
Economic Planning Board (ED) and the  YLinistry of Commerce and Industry 
(McI). KECO is responsible t o  MCI. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
A s  of Fbbruary 28, 1969, the  monthly progress report  submitted by KECO, 
estimated tha t  the t o t a l  foreign exchange cost of t h i s  project t o  be $2l.3 
million. A s  the  Loan was authorized i n  t h e  amount of $22.5 million, approx- 
imately $1.2 mill ion i s  avai lable  f o r  deobligation (See Recommendation No. 1, 
Page 5).  
Our examination indicated t h a t  t h i s  project,  almost from. inception, has 
been hampered by a se r i e s  of delays which h w e  resul ted i n  the  project comple- 
t i o n  date being extended from December, 1968 t o  mid-July, 1970, with an addi- 
t i o n a l  possible extension of six months due t o  delay i n  procurement of routine 
procurement 'items. These extensions have chief ly  resul ted from 1 )  delay i n  
s i t e  selection; 2) change i n  plant capacity; 3 )  delay i n  awarding the  prime 
construction contract;  4) lack of adequate storage area a t  p o  ject s i t e ;  and 
5 ) the  apparent m s a t i s f  actory performance of the consulting engineer. 
Our examination indicated t h a t  of the t o t a l  value of commodity a r r iva l s  as 
of February 28, 1969, approximately $6,050,000, or  7s of the  t o t a l  a r r iva ls ,  
had remained i n  customs area f o r  an average of 190 days. Storage charges on 
these commodities resul ted i n  an additional won cost t o  KECO of the  dol la r  equiv- 
a len t  of approximately $53,000. The delay i n  the release from custom area was 
primarily due t o  using the  custom-. area a s  a storage area while awaiting the  
award of the  construction contr *, and the subsequent mobilization of the 
contractor. Included i n  the  m4.1nt of $6,050,000 were seven separate shipments 
with a t o t a l  value of $245,000 t h a t  arr ived a t  the  port of Inchon i n  April May 
and June, 1968 but were being held i n  custo~ns pending receipt  of complete 
shipping documents. Our v i s i t  t o  the  port area and t h e  project s i t e  i n  early, 
April, 1969, revealed tha t  a l l  the  above commodities had been released from 
customs and received a t  the s i t e  area. Commodities t h a t  arr ived subsequent t o  
December 31, 1968, were being cleared through customs i n  a timely manner. 
Although a l l  commodities financed under t h i s  loan were shipped, CIF, Inchon, 
nKECOts a r r i v a l  procedures did not provide f o r  a complete and thorough inspection 
u n t i l  the commodities arrived a t  the off-s i te  storage area.  Therefore, a s  
inspection was delayed on many commodities f o r  six months or  more a f t e r  a r r i v a l  
at  port, long a f t e r  the  marine insurance had expired, claims f o r  items damaged 
while i n  t r a n s i t  could not be made even though the insurance was financed under 
the  loan (See Recommendation No. 2, page 13).  
KECO has qot complied with ce r t a in  covenants and warranties provided i n  
the  han Agreement. We found tha t  KECO had not adjusted i ts e l e c t r i c a l  r a t e s  
a s  of June 30, 1968, as required by Section 6 . l (b )  of the  h a n  Agreement. The 
ROKG equity posit ion of 6% of the  t o t a l  outstanding stock as of the  date of . 
the  Loan Agreement had decreased t o  52% of the  t o t a l  outstanding stock as of 
December 31, 1948. . Such a decrease of ROKG equity w a s  contrary t o  the  provi - 
sions of ~ec t&on:6 , l ( c ) ,  which provided t h a t  the  ROKG was t o  maintain the  same 
equity posit ion i n  KECO t h a t  it had at  the  date of the  Loan Agreement, namely 
6% of the  t o t a l  outstanding stock. Additfcnally, a ten-year plan prepared i n  
February, 1969. re f lec ted  tha% KECO would only be able t o  provide approximately 
17% of the  required investment cap i t a l  a s  compared t o  the  4% required by 
Section 6,l(c).  (See Recommendation No. 3, page 33). 
During our "examination, we noted t h a t  USAID f i l e s  did not contain adequate 
documentation as t o  the jus t i f i ca t ion  $or allowing a cer ta in  overhead r a t e  t h a t  
- 
becane an in t eg ra l  part of the lump-sum contract award t o  the  consulting engi- 
neer. This apparently occurred due t o  a lack of a formalized Mission policy at 
- t he  time the contract was awarded, establ ishing the  area of responsibi l i ty  of 
the Mission Controller i n  reviewing the  f inancia l  aspects of Mission approved 
contracts (Ses ' Recommendation No. 4, page 16 ) . 
. .  
' . . I *  
O u r  review :indicated t h a t .  KECO 1 s unaudited 'f inancial  s t a t  enent s a s  'of 
December 31, 1968, did not r e f l e c t  an. accrual f o r  corporate income taxes i n  the 
amount of won 1,559 mill ion (equivalent of $5.5 mill ion) and did not provide 
fo r  the estinqted retirement fund' l i a b i l i t y  of Won 6,545 mil l ion (equivalent of 
$23.4 million) : ' 
. , 
Other tharl t he  exceptions and deficiencied discussed above, our examina- 
t i o n  indicated t h a t  the  performance of ROKG, a s  the  Borrower, and KECO, a s  the  
Beneficiary, was sa t i s fac tory  i n  a l l  mater ial  respects and i n  accordance with 
applicable A I D  regulations. 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
EXCESS LOAN FUNDS 
A s  shown i n  Exhibit I, a s  02 February 28, 1969, the t o t a l  amount of 
Letters of Commitment authorized was $19,397,534 and disbursements to ta led  
$9,410,738. I n  t h e i r  progress report  as of February 28, 1969, KECO reported 
the estimated dol la r  cost f o r  t h i s  project t o  be $21.3 mill ion which indicates  
tha t  the authorized loan amount of $22.5 mill ion may not be needed to. complete 
t h i s  project! IED o f f i c i a l s  s t a t e d t h a t  they referred tha t  deobllgatlons be 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 1 
9 deferred u n t l l  completion of procurement of 1 U.S. materials. 
AD/DL should review the estimated t o t a l  
dol la r  cost  of t h i s  project and i n i t i a t e  
appropriate deobligation action f o r  amounts 
not needed t o  complete the  project. 
DELAY I N  TIMELY F'ROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
Due t o  the acute e l e c t r i c a l  power shortage exis t ing i n  Korea a t  the time 
Seoul Thermal Power project was approved, and due t o  the then estimated gen- 
erat ing capacity deficiency tha t  would exist at the end of 1968, both the USAID 
and ROKG assigned a high p r io r i ty  t o  t h i s  project i n  order t o  meet the  ta rge t  
completion date of the end of CY 1968.' Despite t h i s  project being considered 
as prior i ty ,  it has been hampered, almost since its inception, by a aer ies  of 
delays tha t  have resul ted i n  the f i n a l  completion date being extended t o  July, 
1970, some 18  months l a t e r  than the t a rge t  date envisioned i n  the Capital 
Assistance Paper. A s  of t he  date of t h i s  report ,  it is conceivable t h a t  the 
f i n a l  completion date  may be extended an addi t ional  six months t o  January, 
1971, due t o  the consulting engineer, GAI,  allowing routine procurement items 
t o  become c r i t i c a l  t o  project completim. KECOfs monthly progress report ,  a s  
of February 28, 1969, indicated t h a t  t h i s  project was 46% complete. O u r  exam- 
ina t ion  indicated t h a t  t he  various delays were chief ly a t t r ibutable  t o  the  
enumerated points discussed, i n  de ta i l ,  below. 
1. S i t e  Selection - I n  the Feas ib i l i ty  Study prepared by GAI  i n  August 
1965, two s i t e s  were considered as  desirable locations fo r  a 125MW plant. One 
was a t  Tangin-ri, the  s i t e  of exis t ing power f a c i l i t i e s  on the  western out- 
s k i r t s  of Seoul, and the  second proposal was at Dukso, an area on which power 
plants had not previously been constructed, twenty kilometers eas t  of Seoul, 
The Feas ib i l i ty  Report recommended the  Dukso s i t e  based on a s l i g h t  cost savings 
A 
and lower t ransportat ion costs f o r  fuel .  However, because of the des i r ab i l i t y  
of both s i t e s  and because USAID f e l t  t ha t  t he  cost data f o r  both s i t e s  had not 
been developed i n  su f f i c i en t  depth, the Loan Agreement was signed with a Con- 
d i t i o n  Precedent t h a t  pr ior  t o  issuance of a l e t t e r  of commitment t h a t  a project 
s i t e  would be selected. 
Based upon USAIDIS request f o r  a more refined cost analysis and due t o  
extensive flooding of the  Dukso s i t e  i n  July, 1965, coupled with the  f ac t  t ha t  
Dukso become pa r t i a l ly  occupied by an indus t r i a l  firm, G A I  performed a re- 
evaluation of t h e i r  or ig ina l  proposal and issued an-"Addendum t o  Feas ib i l i ty  
Study." This "Addendum" recommended Tangin-ri a s  the  more favorable locat ion 
based on a dol lar-coet  savings under t h e  loan of approximately $912,000. 
The proposal t o  consider Tangin-ri a s  t h e  project s i t e  was submitted t o  
USAID f o r  approval on April 2, 1966, and a f t e ~  KECOfs submission of evidence 
of s i t e  ava i l ab i l i t y  on April 27, 1966, approval was granted on May 13, 1966, 
three months a f t e r  the  signing of the  loan 8,greement. 
2. Channelin Plant Capacity Resul t im i n  Delay i n  Awarding Steam and 
Turbine Generator Contracts - The Loan Agreement and the r e l a t ed  supporting 
documents as  well  a s  the Feas ib i l i ty  Report and the  i n i t i a l  Project Design 
Report a l l  provided f o r  a t h e r m  power plant with a guaranteed generating 
capacity of l25MW. It was not u n t i l  May, 1966, -some three  months a f t e r  t he  
loan agreement was signed, t h a t  USAID received, a copy of a l e t t e r  G A I  Lad 
wri t ten t o  KECO regarding specif icat ions f o r  the  steam and turbine generators, 
t b a t  USAID become aware tha t  a change i n  plant capacity from a continuous 
gumanteed output of 125M t o  l37.5MW was contemplated. The USAID subsequently 
determined that. the  decision t o  increase t h e  plant capacity had been made by 
KECO as ear ly  as February, 1966, and KECO had made known t h i s  in ten t  t o  CAI, 
although nei ther  G A I  nor KECO requested USAID approval of the  proposed change. 
Due t o  the  acute. power shortage &sting i n  Korea, KECO, with USAID con- 
currence, authorized GAI  t o  prepare IFB documents t o  provide f o r  a l te rna te  
bids : one fo r  l25MW, the  other f o r  137.5MW. The IFBIs were issued and were 
scheduled t o  be opened on July 15, 1966. The addi t ional  foreign exchange 
requirements due' t o  the increase i n  the s i ze  of the  un i t  was estimated t o  be 
approximately $1.1 million. 
. ,.  
A s  AID/W had not aathorized the  increase i n  the plant capacity at the  
time scheduled fo r  the bid openings, AID/W advised USAID t o  inform KECO and 
G A I  t o  d e l w  bid openings u n t i l  AID/W was assured tha t  t he  amendment t o  the 
Loan Authorization would be approved. AID/W approval was somewhat delayed due 
t o  the  thorough review required i n  AID/W i n  order tha t  they could be assured 
t h a t  KECO, with USAID concurrence, was not simply t ry ing  t o  take f u l l  advantage 
of available loan funds resu l t ing  f romthe  savings a t t r ibutable  t o  the change 
of s i t e .  
AID/W approved the increase in plant capacity on September 12, 1966, and 
authorized the  opening of the bid documents on t h i s  same date. Although the  
bid documents fo r  both the  steam and turbine generators were opened i n  September, 
1966, the contract awards were not approved u n t i l  January and February 1967, due 
t o  length of t i d e  involved i n  bid evaluation a s  a r e s u l t  of KECO and G A I  f a i lu re  
t o  reach agreement with USAID a s  t o  what consti tuted a non-responsive reply. 
The contract f o r  the  steam generator was awarded t o  the  Foster-Wheeler Corpora- 
t i o n  and the  turbine generator t o  the International General Elec t r ic  Company on 
February 27, 1967, some eight months l a t e r  than the or ig ina l  engineering plan 
estimated. 
3 .  Delay i n  Awarding the Prime Construction Contract - It was or iginal ly  
planned t h a t  t he  mobilization of the  construction contractor would be required 
t o  be completed in the f a l l  of 1967 i f  a project completion date, a s  or ig ina l ly  
planned-by GAI,  of March-April, 1969 was t o  be achieved. The acti ial  mobiliza- 1 
t i o n  of the  construction contractor, Dillingham Overseas Corp. (DILCO) was not 
completed u n t i l  September, 1968. The primary reason f o r  t h i s  lengthy delay was 
the time required by G A I  and t h e i r  apparent i n a b i l i t y  t o  prepare adequate spec- 
i f i ca t ions  and b id  request (see page 9 ). Another fac tor  which contributed t o  
the delay of construction contract award was the  omission of cer ta in  cost factors  
by DILCO which were not discovered by DILCO u n t i l  subsequent t o  the bid openings. 
T h i e e r r o r  of omission resul ted i n  D I L C O t s  o r ig ina l  bid being increased by 
$&32,000. 
The bids were opened on February U+, 1968, and of the seven submissions, 
DILCO was found t o  be the  most favorable. I n  f ac t ,  DILCO1s o f fe r  was so much 
lower than the  next of fer  (37% lower o r  4@ lower than G A I  1s estimate) tha t  a 
meeting was held i n  AIDD with GAI personnel t o  determine i f  DILCOts low bid 
was prompted by any short-coming i n  the  IFB. However, nei ther  AID/W nor G A I  
were able t o  f ind  any er rors  i n  DILCO1s  proposal. AID/W recommended, t h a t  KECO 
should obtain a confirmation of the  bid from DILCO, and the.USAID acted accord- 
ingly, Before such a confirmation had.been requested, DILCO not i f ied  GAI t h a t  
i n  reviewing the  d e t a i l s  of t h e i r  bid documents the  c l e r i c a l  omission of 
$432,000 had been discovered. 
, , 
I n  order t o  determine tha t  DILCO was able t o  present c lear  and convincing 
evidence t h a t  t h e i r  bid, a s  submitted, contained a c l e r i ca l , e r ro r ,  and tha t  it 
was not merely an attempt t o  negotiate an adjustment of t h e i r  bid price, DILCO 
o f f i c i a l s  were requested t o  come t o  Korea t o  o f fe r  explanation a s  t o  how. the 
e r ro r  occurred. A t  t h i s  meeting, attended by various representatives from 
USAID, G A I ,  DILCO and KECO, DILCO o f f i c i a l s  explained tha t  the t o t a l  e r ror  
amounted t o  $432,000 and resul ted from (1) bu i lde r t s  r i s k  insurance of $162,000 
being deducted twice (as the bid evaluation excluded insurance t h i s  fac tor  
should have been deducted from the t o t a l  cost estimate); (2) an amount of 
$270,000 f o r  constructioa equipment which had been or ig ina l ly  planned f o r  Won 
financing but subsequently sh i f ted  t o  do l l a r  financing. The amount of $270,000 
was, deducted from the  Won cost, but never added t o  the dol la r  cost. DIICO a lso  
submitted copies of working papers which supported th.eir  verbal remarks a s  t o  
how the e r ro r  occurred and a notarized a f f idav i t s  from D I L C O t s  vice-president 
s t a t ing  tha t  the c l e r i c a l  e r ro r  was unintentional and not an e r ro r  of judgement. 
Based upon the above evidence, USAID concluded, a s  did KECO and GAI,  t ha t  
the  e r ror  was unintentional and DILCO was allowed t o  increase t h e i r  or ig ina l  
proposal by $432,000 which st i l l  allowed DILCO t o  maintain t h e i r  posit ion a s  
low bidder, 
The USAID approved the award t o  DIE0 on Apr i l30 ,  1968. The contract 
between KECO and DILCO was signed on May 24, 1968, i n  the  lump-sum amount of 
$2,528,007, with loca l  cos ts  being reimbursable i n  Won. 
4. Lack of Adequate Storage Area a t  Project S i t e  - A t  the  time the  Loan 
Agreemmt was signed, the  only power plant being planned f o r  construction a t  
t h e  Tangin-ri s i t e  was the  plant being financed under t h i s  loan. Although 
- three other power generating units were located on the.Tangin-ri s i t e ,  the  
available unoccupied area was considered en t i r e ly  adequate t o  permit on-site 
storage. However, in July, 1967, KECO entered i n t o  an agreement with a Japanese 
f i r m  f o r  the  construction of a 250MW t h e d  plant t o  be located adjacent t o  
t h e  A I D  financed power plant. This Japanese plant was constructed on a turnkey 
award, a s  compared t o  31 separate b id  documents required f o r  the  A I D  financed 
power plant. , Physical construction commenced i n  January, 1968, and t h e  plant 
was completed i n  February, 1969, a t  a foreign exchange cost of $26 million. 
Although the  Japanese plant was almost completed a t  the time construction . 
commenced on the A I D  financed plant, the l imited lay-down area available a t  
t h e  s i t e  a s  a r e s u l t  of the  area occupied by the  Japanese plant, presented a 
storage problem. A s  a r e su l t ,  KECO had t o  obtain a storage area approximately 
two miles f romthe  plant s i t e .  The distance between the  storage area  and the  
plant s i t e  resul ted i n  some delay in construction progress due t o  the  time l o s t  
i n  transporting large-sized and heavy construction materials from storage area 
t o  project s i t e  and t h e  addi t ional  time l o s t  because of working conditions 
resu l t ing  from operating i n  a cramped area. Additionally, the  locat ion of the  
storage area at other than the  project s i t e  resul ted i n  an increased foreign 
exchange cost of approximately $18,000 a s  a r e su l t  of an amendment t o  DILCOts 
contract which extended bui lder ' s  r i s k  insurance coverage t o  materials and 
equipment located at other than the project s i t e .  
A s  s ta ted  previously, the  construction of the  Japanese financed plant 
adjacent t o  the A I D  financed plant did r e s a t  i n  some delay although we do not 
f e e l  t ha t  it could be considered' a major element t h a t  contributed t o  the  over- 
a l l  delay of the project. I n  retrospect,  t he  completion of the  Japanese plant 
i n  ear ly 1969 a l lev ia ted  an e l e c t r i c a l  power shortage i n  Korea t h a t  was partially 
caused by the A I D  financed plant not being completed by t h e  end of 1968 as 
or ig ina l ly  planned i n  the  Capital  Assistance Paper. 
5. Performance of the Consultina Ennineer. Gilbert  Associates, Inc, - 
It is the opinion of both USAID and KECO t h a t  the  performance of GAI has been 
en t i r e ly  unsatisfactory, resul t ing i n  the  extension of the  project completion 
date, the - l a t e s t  being the possible delay of project completion f o r  an additional 
six months due t o  GAI  allowing routine prozurement items t o  become c r i t i c a l  t o '  
project completion. USAIDIS and K E C O t s  d i s sa t i s f ac t ion  with G A I l s  performance 
commenced almost f romthe  beginning of the  project and has been the  subject of 
numerous messages between USAID, AID/W and GAI.  
The se lec t ion  of GAI by KECO a s  the c o n ~ u l t i n g  engineer f o r  t h i s  project 
was based upon G A I t s  previous experience and sa t i s fac tory  performance, partic- 
u l a r ly  on the f e a s i b i l i t y  study f o r  the  two Tangin-ri 66MW unit projects i n  
1962 and the  f e a s i b i l i t y  study completed i n  August, 1965, pertaining t o  t h i s  
project. In order t h a t  the  i n i t i a l  engineering could commence pr ior  t o  the  
signing of the  Loan Agreement, and thereby allowing a rapid implementation of 
t h i s  p r io r i ty  project, KECO, with A I D  approval, signed a provisional contract 
with G A I  on October 14, 1765. The main contract was approved by A I D  and signed 
by KECO and G A I  on February 22, 1966. The contract award was fo r  a lump-sum 
amount of $1,069,000, except f o r  an amount not t o  exceed $50,000 allowed f o r  
t ra in ing  KECO personnel on a cost reimbursable basis .  The oqiginal contract 
ca l led  f o r  44 man-months of supervision but a proposed increase was approved 
by USAID i n  August, 1968 t o  provide f o r  an adcUtional.43.5 man-months, and 
i n  February, 1969 the  USAID approved KECOla request f o r  an additional 1 2  man- 
months of supervision. I n  summary, the  t o t a l  man-months has been increased 
from 44. st ipulated i n  the  or ig ina l  contract t o  t h e  current requirement of 99.5 
man-months, a t  a do l l a r  cost  increase of $154,570. GAI,. i n  requesting approval 
of the  additional man-months, s ta ted  tha t  t he  increase was due t o  addi t ional  
respons ib i l i t ies  not contemplated i n  the or ig ina l  contract. Correspondence, 
we reviewed indicated t h a t  t he  USAID, in approving these increases, s t a t ed  tha t  
while some of the  causes f o r  addi t ional  man-months can be a t t r ibuted  t o  G A I f s  
performance, the  delays were not so le ly  a t t r ibutable  t o  the  Engineer o r  i t s  
personnel, and therefore authorized the  increase i n  the  do l l a r  f ee  a s  provided 
under the  contract. 
Commented on below, a r e  selected actions or  areas of performance which we 
f e e l  w i l l  c lear ly  i l l u s t r a t e  G A I f s  unsatisfactory'performance a s  the consulting ,* 
engineer f o r  t h i s  project. 
. . 
A. Fkerraration of Bid Documents,- GAI,  i n  their '  contract with KECO, re- 
presented tha t  they were capable of preparing complete procurement inv i t a t ion  
documents i n  accordance with A I D  regulatory requirements. Their preparation of 
the  turbine and steam generator documents and t h e  construction contract document 
were hardly i l l u s t r a t i v e  of G A I  f s a b i l i t y ,  t o  perform 'according. t o  t h e i r  contract 
specifications.  The turbine and steam generator,documents were not only some 
four months l a t e  i n  being submitted t o  KECO and USAID.for review, the  documents 
required extensive review .and edi t ing by USAID personnel i n  order t h a t ' t h e  doc- . 
uments -could conform t o  USAID requirements. * 
-- -- 
G A I f s  performance on the construction contract documents was a repe t i t ion  
of t h e i r  performance on the  turbine and steam generator document-&, Despite ' 
repeated requests by USAID and KECO t h a t  t he  specifications should.be submitted 
i n  a timely manner, G A I  was some f ive  months l a t e  i n  submitting the  documents. 
These documents were so poorly prepared tha t  a f ive  month period of time was 
required, by USAID and KECO t o  review and prepare an acceptable format. KECO, 
at USAID request, no t i f ied  GAI t h a t  USAID could not ju s t i fy  the  expenditure of 
so much time i n  reviewing IFB documents and suggested tha t  i f  G A I  did not have 
qual i f ied personnel t o  perform i n  accordance with t h e i r  ,contract t ha t  a contract 
spec ia l i s t  should be hired. USAID a lso  informed a vice-president of G A I  i n  
August, 1967, of t h e i r  displeasure of G A I  1 s performance, par t icular ly the per- 
formance of the  project manager. 
B. Procurement of Structural  S tee l  - 1n '  August, 1967, i n  order t o  avoid 
an addi t ional  project delay of an addi t ional  eight: months, the G A I  project 
engineer recommended t o  KECO, t ha t  A I D  concurrence be obtained t o  procure some 
950 tons of s t ruc tu ra l  s t e e l  on a proprietary basis. G A I  advised the Mssion 
tha t  procurement could not hare been i n i t i a t e d  at an e a r l i e r  date due t o  the 
delay i n  awadizig the  steam boi le r ,  a s  steam boi le r  specifications a re  nec- 
essary f o r  s t e e l  design. KECO, with concurrence of USAID and GAI ,  was able 
t o  obtain a firm of fer  from Foster Wheeler Corp., the  supplier of the steam 
b o i l e r  t ha t  Foster Wheeler would guarantee, as  a change order t o  the steam 
b o i l e r  contract, delivery of 950 tons by A p r i l  30, a t  a t o t a l  CIF of $515 
per ton. CAI  advised KECO and USAID t h a t  no lower price could be anticipated 
from competitive bidding and on t h i s  advice USAID requested AID/W i n  October 
1967 t o  approve procurement on a proprietary basis.  
AID/W did not approve the  above request and s ta ted  t h a t  despite the  G A I  
project manager s t a t ing  t h a t  $515 per ton was reasonable, G A I 1 s  home of f ice  
informed AID/W t o  the  contrary. AID/W was able t o  i n i t i a t e  a streamlined bid 
procedure f o r  the s t ruc tu ra l  s t e e l  which resul ted i n  the contract being awarded 
i n  ear ly December, 1967, a t  a cost of $432 per ton, $83 per ton  l e s s  than the  
Foster Wheeler proposal. Had AID/W approved the  proprietary procurement a s  
recommended by the  G A I  project manager, t he  addi t ional  and unnecessary cost t o  
KECO would have approximated $92,000. 
C. Performance of Certain G A I  Personnel- G A I l s  unsatisfactory performance 
can be d i r ec t ly  re la ted  t o  the  performance of the  project manager and t o  a l e s se r  
extent the performance of the resident engineer. USAID has, on numerous occasions, 
expressed i t s  concern t o  G A I  o f f i c i a l s ,  and A I D / W  as  t o  the  professional qual i f i -  
cations and a b i l i t i e s  a s  well  a s  the  apparent lack of concern of the  project 
manager with the  project. The f r i c t i o n  and lack of communication between the  
project manager and the  resident engineer have contributed t o  the  overal l  un- 
sa t i s fac tory  performance of GAI.  
The delay i n  submitting IFB documents t o  KECO and USAID f o r  approval and 
the unsatisfactory manner i n  which such documents were prepared,was chief ly the  
responsibi l i ty  of the  project manager. The USAID recommendation t o  AID/W t o  
authorize s t ruc tu ra l  s t e e l  t o  be procured on a proprietary bas is  was the r e su l t  
and advice given by the  project engineer. There have been cases where the  
project manager issued change orders without the pr ior  approval of KECO o r  USAID. 
A review of USAID f i l e s  indicated t h a t  l e t t e r s  of in ten t  t o  award a contract were 
issued on a t  l e a s t  two occasions pr ior  t o  A I D  approval of the  award. These 
l e t t e r s  were, however, issued with the  approval of KECO despi te  the  f a c t  t ha t  
both KECO and G A I  were aware tha t  such a practice was improper under A I D  procure- 
ment regulations. O u r  review indicated a lso  tha t  i n  another case, following a 
bid opening but pr ior  t o  the award, there was an exchange of correspondence 
between G A I  and two bidders i n  which G A I  requested t h a t  the  bidders a l t e r  t h e i r  
bid so tha t  they would be f u l l y  responsive. 
. 
The project manager was also responsible fo r  the f a i l u r e  t o  periodically 
revise the construction schedule prepared a t  the time of the  award of the  con- 
s t ruc t ion  contract.  A s  a r e su l t ,  four routine procurement items have become 
c r i t i c a l  f o r  plant completion and may re su l t  i n  delaying the  completion date 
another six months, t o  January, 1971. A s  the  USAID was unable t o  obtain a 
current construction schedule from the project manager, AID/W was requested 
t o  have GAIfs home of f ice  provide a detai led procurement and design schedule 
from which a meaningful revised construction schedule could be developed. 
Due t o  KECOfs and USAIDfs f a i lu re  t o  obtain from GAI any indicat ion tha t  
action was being i n i t i a t e d  t o  correct the  defici'encies i n  the performance of 
t h e i r  personnel, USAID recommended i n  March, 1969, t o  AID/W t h a t  AIDD refuse 
t o  approve any A I D  financing of future G A I  contracts. 
In  summary, the main problem has been the various delays i n  implementation 
which resul ted i n  extending the completion date from December, 1968 t o  mid-Jay 
1970, with a poss ib i l i t y  of an addi.tional six month delay t o  January, 1971. 
The delays resul ted pa r t i a l ly  fro& the (1) change i n  s i t e  selection, (2) change 
i n  plant capacity, (3) the  delay i n  awarding the  construction contract, and (4) 
lack of adequate storage area a t  the project s i t e .  As these problem areas have 
since been resolved no fur ther  act ion i s  required. 
The problem s t i l l  facing t h i s  project i s  the  performance of the consulting 
engineer. Despite the  f a c t  t h a t  USAID and KECO have had various meetings and 
discussions with G A I  on t h e i r  unsatisfactory performance, the problem"sti.11 
prevails,  AID/W has been advised i n  numerous messages from USAID of the  un- 
sa t i s fac tory  performance of G A I .  We believe t h a t  USAIDfs recommendation t o  
AID/W t h a t  i n  the  fu ture  AID/W should not approve G A I  contracts f o r  A I D  finan- 
cing was just i f ied.  The only .other apparent recourse would be f o r  A I D  t o  rec- 
ommend tha t  KECO terminate i t s  contract with G A I  and obtain a new consulting 
engineer, However, such a course of action, although it may r e s u l t  i n  greater  
efficiency and be t t e r  coordination of project a c t i v i t i e s ,  would undoubtedly 
r e s u l t  i n  the project being delayed-even longer than presently anticipated, due 
t o  the time l o s t  i n  obtaining and orienting a new engineer. The USAID technical 
divisions a re  maintaining close surveillance over t h i s  project and the  problem 
described above, Contact with KECO i s  maintained, almost on a da i ly  basis,  
regarding t h i s  and other A I D  financed projects, and i n  addition personnel from 
IED-Power Branch at tend weekly progresg meetings on t h i s  project held at  the  
project s i t e .  Accordingly, we do not f e e l  t ha t  a recommendation is warranted. 
DELAY I N  UTILIZATION OF COWDITIES 
During the months of November, 1968, through April, 1969, we made a number 
of v i s i t s  t o  the port area, project s i t e ,  and storage s i t e s  fo r  the  purpose of 
physicalLy examining commodities and t o  review a r r i v a l  and d is t r ibut ion  procedures 
and re la ted  records. The f i r s t  shipment of commodities arrived at the  port of 
Inchon i n  March, 1968 and a s  of February 28, 1969, the  t o t a l  value of a r r iva l s  a t  
port approximated $8,502,000. 
O u r  examination indicated tha t  of the  t o t a l  value of a r r iva l s  as  of February 
28, 1969, approximately 71%, or  $6,050,000, had remained i n  customs area f o r  on 
an average of 190 days. I n  discussing the  reasons f o r  commodities remaining i n  
customs f o r  such a long period of time, KECO s ta ted,  and the  USAID technical  
divisions confirmed, t h a t  the primary reason was due t o  the delay i n  awarding 
the prime construction contract which i n  tu rn  delayed the mobilization of the  
constmction contractor. The nobi l izat ion of the  contractor was or ig ina l ly  
scheduled t o  be completed i n  mid-January, 1968, but was not completed u n t i l  
the beginning of October, 1968, with the  subcontract f o r  loca l  construction 
services being awarded on October 31, 1968. This delay, compounded by a l imited 
storage area a t  the immediate s i t e  due t o  the  construction of a.Japanese financed 
power plant adjacent t o  the  A I D  financed power plaat,  resul ted i n  KECO delaying 
release from the customs area those commodities not immediately required a t  the  
job s i t e ,  thereby u t i l i z ing  a bonded customs area a s  storage space. This delay 
resul ted i n  addi t ional  storage charges t o  KECO, payable i n  won, i n  the  dol la r  
equivalent of approximately $53,000. 
Included i n  the amount of $6,050,000 above, were seven separate shipments 
i n  the  approximate amount of $245,000 tha t  arrived a t  the  port of Inchon during 
April, May and June of 1968. These commodities were physically examined'by us 
during 0r.e of our ~ o r t  v i s i t s  i n  February, 1969. We were informed by KECO t h a t  
although the  commodities would soon be needed they were unable t o  obtain customs 
release a s  G A I  had not provided the complete s e t  of shipping documents a s  re- 
quired by t h e i r  contract. KECO, i n  the meantime, and pr ior  t o  our port v i s i t ,  
had corresponded d i r ec t ly  with the  supplier i n  an attempt t o  obtain the  appro- 
pr ia te  shipping documents. 
O u r  subsequent v i s i t  t o  the  Inchon port and the project s i t e  i n  ear ly  
April, 1969, revealed tha t  a l l  commodities i n  the  port area, a s  of December 31, 
1968, had been released from customs and transported t o  the job-site storage 
area,  Additionally, commodities tha t  arrived subsequent t o  December 31, 1968, 
were being released f romthe  customs area on a timely basis.  Our examination 
did not indicate  tha t  the above delays i n  customs clearance had any material  
e f fec t  on the timely implementation of the  project. A s  the  above findings were 
acted upon during t h i s  audit, no recommendation i s  made. KECOls  delay i n  not 
u t i l i z ing  $3.4 mill ion of commodities f o r  a half year period resul ted i n  an 
unnecessary i n t e r e s t  cost t o  KECO of the dol la r  equivalent of approximately 
a $199,000, This i n  turn  cost the ROKG, as the  Borrower, approximately $32,000 
i n  foreign exchange. 
MARINE INSURANCE 
A l l  commodities financed under t h i s  loan were shipped CIF, Inchon, and 
the cost of the  marine insurance was financed from proceeds made available 
f romthe  loan. The terms of the insurance usually provided t h a t  the  insurance 
was t o  be effect ive u n t i l  commodities were delivered t o  tkz  job-site or s ix ty  
days a f t e r  a r r i v a l  at the port of entry, whichever occurred first. Inasmuch 
as  KECOls  a r r i v a l  procedures a t  the Inchon port did not provide f o r  a thorough 
inspection of commodities u n t i l  a r r i v a l  a t  job-site, KECO was unable t o  obtain 
f u l l  benefi t  from the loan-financed insurance a s  KECO could only make claims 
f o r  the  obviously missing or damaged commodities a t  the  time of a r r i v a l  a t  port. 
For commodities t h a t  remained i n  the  port area f o r  over s ix ty  days, as  did the  
majority of the  commodities a r r iv ing  pr ior  t o  December 31, 1968, the  dollar- 
financed marine insurance would not be applicable. 
Our discussions with I E C O  personnel during the course of t h i s  examination 
regarding the insurance s i tuat ion,  confirmed tha t  there were some shortages and 
damaged commodities and t h a t  KECO was i n i t i a t i n g  claims.with the l o c a l t r a n s -  
portation f i rm. fo r  those losses  tha t  could be d i r ec t ly  at t r ibutable  t o  the 
t ransportat ion firm. I n  one instance, KECO i n i t i a t e d  procur2ment from a United 
S ta t e s  f i rm f o r  the  replacement commodity, financing the cost from i t s  own 
resources (the foreign exchange being obtained from the Korea Foreign Exchange 
~ a n k )  . KECO fur ther  informed us tha t  they had never attempted t o  f i l e  a claim 
under the  insurance financed f romthe  proceeds of this loan because, a s  indicated 
above, complete inspection of the  commodities had not been made at the time of 
a r r i v a l  but ra ther  a f t e r  they had been delivered t o  the project storage s i t e .  
We were a l so  to ld  by KECO o f f i c i a l s  t ha t  they had not o f f i c i a l l y  informed A I D  
of the extent of the  losses  t h a t  may have been recoverable under the provisions 
of the  marine insurance. A s  of the  date of t h i s  report ,  KECO was i n  process 
of performing a detai led review t o  determine the  extent of damaged commodities. 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 2 
AD/DL should (1) request KECO t o  submit complete 
d e t a i l s  as  t o  value and extent of commodity damages 
or  shortages, and plans f o r  replacement and (2) 
determine what act ion i s  required regarding the  
non-utilization of dollar-financed marine insurance. 
COVENANTS AND WARRANTIES CONCERNING THE PROJECT 
Our examination indicated tha t  cer ta in  covenants and warranties were not 
being s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  complied with. Specifically,  Section 6 . l (b) ,  of the Loan 
Agreement, i n  accordance with a recommendation of the PST, provided tha t  "Borrower 
s h a l l  permit Beneficiary t o  increase its power r a t e s  annually, i f  necessary t o  
a t t a i n  a minimum r a t e  of re turn  of 84% f o r  the year 1967 and 9% f o r  the year 1968 
and each year thereaf ter  on the  r a t e  base a s  a d j ~ s t e d . . . . . ~ ~  Due t o  KECOls appar- 
ent i n a b i l i t y  t o  comply with the  above requirement, a s  well a s  cer ta in  other 
warranties and covenants, the provisions of Section 6.1(b) were amended by 
Amendment No. 11, dated June 17, 1967, and fur ther  amended by a l e t t e r  of agree- 
ment dated uctober 8, 1967. 
Section 6 . l (b  ) as  f i n a l l y  amended, provides "Beneficiary s h a l l  increase i t s  
r a t e s  no l a t e r  than June 30, 1968, and annually thereaf te r ,  t o  provide a percent- 
- 
age of increase i n  operating revenues over those which otherwise would have been 
realized, such increase t o  be not l e s s  than the percentage i n  value due t o  reval- 
uation of Beneficiary's net u t i l i t y  plantOl1 
I n  December, 1967, KECO submitted t o  the  USAID f inancia l  data on t h e i r  
plant revaluation computations f o r  the  period June 30, 1965 t o  June 30, 1967. 
A This da ta  re f lec ted  tha t  a 3.3% r a t e  increase would be required t o  s a t i s f y  
Section 6.l(b).  A s  KECO had increased t h e i r  s a t e s  by 15% i n  November, 1967, the 
USAID Power Rate Committee concluded t h a t  Section 6.1(b) had been sa t i s f ied .  
I n  accordance with l e t t e r  of agreement amendment dated October 8, 1967, 
which authorized KECO t o  r e s t a t e  i t s  r a t e  base of January 1 of each year, 
KECO submitted data  f o r  the  period July 1, 1967, t o  December 31, 1967, re f lec t -  
ing an increase of the  r a t e  base, and therefore requiring a subsequent increase 
of power r a t e s ,  of 4.88%. The Power Rate Committee, i n  a memo t o  the  USAID 
Director dated October 8, 1968, confirmed the  4.8% increase and s t a t ed  tha t  
USAID could request KECO t o  increase i t s  power r a t e s  proportionately. However, 
the  Committee concluded t h a t  "since the  r a t e  e f f ec t ive . in  November, 1967, was 
15% it i e  concluded t h a t  the  conditions of the b a n  Agreement have been sa t i s -  
f i e d  and no increase i n  e l ec t r i c  r a t e s  should be recommended at t h i s  time." 
We do not f e e l  t h a t  the  in t en t  of Section 6.l(b) a s  it was s ta ted  i n  the  
or ig ina l  ban  Agreement and subsequent amendments was t o  allow an overstatement 
of a r a t e  increase i n  one period t o  be carr ied forward t o  the  next period. The 
l e t t e r  of agreement amendment of October 8, 1967, spec i f ica l ly  s t a t ed  ".. . . . . ' 
acceptance of t h e i r  (KEco's) proposal would a l so  mean t h a t  once the  revaluation 
of t h e i r  a s se t s  i s  completed a s  of January 1, 1968, a second r a t e  increase may 
be called fo r  under our loan agreements within 6 monthe 1 following tha t  date, 
namely June 30, 1968. ...." KECO did not increase t h e i r  r a t e s  a s  of June 30, 
1968, nor have they proposed a r a t e  increase as  of the date of this report. 
Section 6 . l ( c  ) of the  Loan Agreement provides the " level  of revenues 
established i n  accordance with sub-section (b) above require continuance of 
the  Borrowerls present policies,  namely: i )  re tent ion of i ts present equity 
posit ion i n  the  Korea Elec t r ic  Company." A t  the  date of t h e  Loan Agreement, 
ROKG equity was represented by 6% of the  t o t a l  outstanding stock, t he  remainder 
of the  stock was held by corporations and individuals. A s  of December 31, 1968, 
the  ROKG equity was represented by only 52% of the  t o t a l  outstanding stock, o r  
a decrease of 16% i n  l e s s  than a three-year period. Inasmuch a s  the ROKG is 
required under the terms of the  loan agreement t o  reinvest any dividends received 
from KECO, any increase i n  equity by the  private sector  r z s u l t s  i n  addi t ional  
dividends payable t o  th r  private sector  and thus a drain on working capi tal .  
The non-compliance with Section 6 . l ( c ) i )  is  even more serious i n  view of 
the  f ac t  t ha t  the provisions of t h i s  Section were based on the premise tha t  
according t o  the  recommendation of PST, power r a t e s  would be adjusted annually 
t o  permit a minimum r a t e  of return of 9$ on the r a t e  base f o r  a l l  years 1968 
and thereaf ter .  During the past three years there has been a continuous decrease 
i n  the r a t e  of re turn  on net u t i l i t y  plant a s  ref lected below. 
Rate of Return on Net U t i l i t y  .Plant 
@xcludins! Construction i n  Prowess) 
A s  of December 31  
Year Rate of Return 
Section 6. l (c)  fur ther  provides t h a t  , . .the operating revenues of the  
Beneficiary s h a l l  be adjusted a s  necessary t o  enable the  Beneficiary t o  finance 
from i t s  own resources fo r ty  t o  f i f t y  per cent (4015s)  of the investment capi- 
t a l  required f o r  t h e  next t e n  years.....ll We were unable t o  s a t i s f y  ourselves 
tha t  KECO continues t o  sa t i s fy  this. requirement, A ten-year plan developed i n  
September 1967 projected t h a t  KECO would be able t o  finance approximately 45% 
of i t s  investment c a p i t a l  requirements, A reviaed ten-year investment plan 
prepared as of February, 1969 ref lec ted  t h a t  i n  the ten-year period (1969-78) 
KECO would only be able t o  provide approximately 175% of the  required investment 
cap i t a l  - 23% below the minimum l e v e l  established by Section 6. l (c) .  
Off ic ia l s ,  of AD/DL and IED with whm we spoke indicated t h a t  i n  t h e i r  
opinion ce r t a in  of the  covenants of the  loan agreement were too r e s t r i c t ive .  
RECOMMENDATION NO. 3 
AD/DL i n  cooperation with IED should e i the r  
(1) i n i t i a t e  necessary act ion t o  assure KECO 
compliance with Section 6. l (b)  and 6 . l (c )  of 
the loan agreement, o r  (2) amend the  loan 
agreement, a s  necessary. 
USAID REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF THE ENGINEERING CONTRACT BETWEEN KECO AND G A I  
During our examination we reviewed the  procedures employed by USAID i n  
reviewing and approving contract awards, A s  de ta i led  i n  another sect ion of 
t h i s  report ,  the  contract f o r  engineering services between KECO and GAI  w ~ s  
signed on February 22, 1966, and was i n  the  negotiated lump-sum amount of 
$1,069,000 except f o r  cost of t ra in ing  KECO personnel which was t o  be on a 
reimburs able a bas i s  not t o  exceed $50,000, 
The se lec t ion  of GAI  by KECO was approved by USAID and AID/W on a pro- 
spective basis ,  t ha t  is, i n  advance of the  approval of the loan subject t o  
the  execution of a loan agreement and t h e  approval by USAID of the  contract 
with G A I .  The contract proposal was reviewed by the USAID Project Committee, 
and based upon the Committeels approval, USAID approved the  contract on 
February 21, 1966. 
A review of the documentation on which the Project Committee based its 
approval of the t o t a l  contract amount revealed t h a t  a detai led cost analysis 
had not been submitted by G A I  f o r  review by the Committee, I n  f ac t ,  the only 
cost data available was i n  a highly summarized form and included on overhead 
fac tor  a t  7s of the  engineering, design, and procurement labor and an allowance 
of 15% of overhead and labor f o r  prof i t ,  escalation and contingencies. The 
overhead f ac to r , and  prof i t ,  escalation, and contingencies fac tor  become an. 
i n t eg ra l  par t  of the lump-sum amount, 
The Project Committee, i n  approving the overhead r a t e  of 70% did not 
request h i s t o r i c a l  cost data from G A I  t o  substant iate  the 70;% fac tor  which, 
i n  the  absence of a confirmed audited overhead ra te ,  i s  the only sound basis  
f o r  determining a reasonable overhead ra te .  The jus t i f i ca t ion  given by the  
Project Committee was tha t  Ifthe general range of overhead fees  charged by 
engineering firms i n  the United States  ranges from about 65% t o  110%. . . . . . . 
So we may conclude t h a t  the  7 s  overhead proposed by Gilbert i s  reasonable and 
probably lower than might prevai l  i n  New York or Chicago.If Additionally, t h e  
Project Committee did not comment or  attempt t o  document the  reasonableness or  
acceptabi l i ty  of the  15% prof i t ,  escalation, and contingencies factor .  
It i s  our opinion t h a t  the  above manner of evaluating the allowable over- 
head and prof i t  escalation fac tor  was not i n  accordance with acceptable account- 
ing or sound business practice.  Despite the f ac t  t ha t  A I D  Manual Order 222.1 
s t a t e s  t h a t  "the Mission Controller has responsibi l i ty  f o r  par t ic ipat ing i n  the  
review of proposed contracts financed i n  l o c a l  currencies or  dol la rs  which a re  
t o  be executed or  approved f o r  financing by the Missionff wp were unable t o  
detect  any evidence indicating t h a t  the Mission Controller had reviewed the  
f inancia l  aspects of the  G A I  contract. It apparently was not a Mission policy 
a t  t h e  time of the  GAI contract award, t o  require Controller review of Wssion 
approved contracts. There i s  currently a formalized Mission policy, U.S.Mission 
Order No. 1201, dated February 7, 1969, which provides t h a t  the  Controller, at 
the discret ion of the  Director, may t e  asked t o  serve as  an ad hoc member of the  
- Capital  Assistance Policy Committee, and the Controller, a t  t he  discret ion of 
AD/DL, may serve on the  Loan Coymittee. The Loan Committee, a s  s ta ted  i n  t h e  
Mission Order, i s  responsible f o r  monitoring and evaluating cap i t a l  assistance. 
Section V,G, of A I D  Manual Order 222.1 enumerates twelve specif ic  areas 
of responsibi l i ty  of the  Mission Controller a s  re la ted  t o  h i s  r o l e  i n  the  Capital 
Assistance process. We do not believe tha t  Mission Order No. 1201 f u l f i l l s  a l l  
the requirements of A I D  Manual Order 222.1 a s  the IEssion Order does not c lear ly  
define the areas of responsibi l i ty  of the  Mission Controller. 
The Controller indicated tha t  t he  various divisions within USAID had been 
verbally informed of the respons ib i l i t ies  of the Controller i n  reviewing con- 
t r a c t s ,  f inancia l  plans, reports,  etc. ,  as s e t  forth.  i n  A I D  M.O. 222.1. He a lso  
s t a t ed  tha t  he has been consulted i n  the past and is current.ly being consulted 
on these matters. 
FIXCOMMENDATION NO. 4 
The USAID Director should amend U.S. Mssion 
Order No. 1201 t o  c lear ly  define the ro le  of 
the  Mssion Controller i n  the  Capital Assistance 
process a s  required by A I D  Manual Order 222.1. 
FINANCIAL CONEITION 
.Due t o  the f a c t  t h a t  KECOfs audited f i runc ia l  statements f o r  the  year 
ended December 31, 1968, were not available a t  the  completion of our audi t  
f i e l d  work, the f inancial  data  presented in  Exhibits I1 and I11 of t h i s  report  
as of December 31, 1968, was taken from KECOts unaudited f inancial  statements 
f o r  the  period then ended. Our examination did not include a detai led review 
of KECOls f inancia l  statements and we are, therefore, unable t o  render an 
opinion a s  t o  the  reasonableness and fa i rness  of the  data  presented as of 
December 31, 1968, However, on a t e s t  basis ,  we ve r i f i ed  t h a t  KECOls f inancia l  
statements as of December 31, 1968 were i n  agreement with t h e i r  general ledger 
accounts. O u r  review of the year end f inancia l  statements, a s  well  as the  
monthly f inancial  statements submitted t o  the  USAID, indicated t h a t  KECOfs 
account classificatiions:. were generally i n  accordance with U.S. Federal Power 
Commission -equirements and tha t ,  with few exceptions, KECOfs f inancia l  s ta te -  
ments were prepared i n  accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.  
These exceptions were a s  follows: 
1. Failure t o  r e f l e c t  ~ r o v i s i o n  f o r  conkorate income taxes 
K E C O f s  'monthly f inancia l  statements did not include a provision f o r  
corporate income taxes which f o r  the  year ended December 31, 1968, amounted t o  
approximately Won 1,550 million, KECO has followed the  practice, which is 
acceptable i n  Korea, of appropriating corporate taxes d i r ec t ly  from unappro- 
pr iated surplus during the  f i s c a l  year immediately following the  period when 
the  taxes should have been accrued. The Cert i f ied Public Accountant, i n  issuin& 
h i s  opinion oh the  f inancia l  statements f o r  the  year ended December 31, 1967, 
took exception t o  t h i s  practice and qual i f ied the  accouritantts opinion accord- 
ingly. 
2, Failure t o  record f u l l  l i a b i l i t y  t o  retirement pension fund 
KECOls l i a b i l i t y  t o  the  retirement pension fund was ref lected on the  
f inancia l  statements as of December 31, 1968, i n  footnote form only. Such a 
pract ice r e su l t s  i n  an overstatement of current and pr ior  years! income and 
the understatement of long term-debt i n  the approximate amount of Won 6,545 
mill ion (approximately $23.4 million). 
3, Failure t o  record A I D  loan disbursements on a timsly basis  
Our review of KECOfs accounting procedures revealed tha t  KECO expe- 
r iences a delay of one t o  two months i n  recording disbursements on A I D  loans. 
This i s  caused by the  delay i n  receiving the  statement of disbursements from 
AID/W.  Such a practice r e s u l t s  in  the understatement of fixed asse ts  and long- 
term debt. 
A s  the f a i lu re  t o  provide f o r  the  current corporate t a x  l i a b i l i t y  from 
current year earnings did not have a material  e f f ec t  on the  f inancial  statements 
a s  of December 31, 1968, and due t o  the f ac t  t ha t  the retirement fund l i a b i l i t y  
was disclosed, in footnote form, on the  f inancia l  statements, we a r e  not 
making a recommendation i n  t h i s  report .  Furthermore, the above deviations 
from generally accepted accounting principles have been commented on i n  
previously issued audi t  reports (Audit Report NOS. 68-12 and 69-4). 
Exhibit I V  r e f l e c t s  KECOls source of long-term debt a n d . i s  provided f o r  
informational purposes. During the course of our examination, we ver i f ied  
tha t  a l l  increases i n  long-term debt subsequent t o  December 31, 1967, the  
l a t e s t  period during which KECOfs  f inancia l  statements were covered by a 
USAID audit ,  were approved by USAID i n  accordance with the requirements of 
the Loan Agreement. For the purpose of determining the a b i l i t y  of KECO t o  
repay its ' long-term debt i n  a timely manner, we made a general review of 
recent f inancia l  projections submitted by KECO t o  the USAID i n  February. 
The f inancia l  projections included estimated' construction expenditures, l oca l  
currency requirements, proposed financing sources, proforma f inancia l  statements 
and cash forecasts  through the year of 1978. We did not attempt t o  ver i fy  the  
accuracy of K E C O l s  projections, but our review indicated tha t  such projections 
appeared t o  be reasonable, and t h a t  KECO would be able t o  meet i ts long-term 
requirements f o r  the  ten-year period covered by the forecast. 
We fur ther  noted, t h a t  KECO was experiencing a shortage of working cap i t a l  
and subsequent. t o  February 28, 1969, obtained approval from ROKG and requested 
USAID approval f o r  a $30 mill ion loan from a United States  firm t o  assist i n  
a l lev ia t ing  t h i s  shortage. The USAID has been constantly aware of t h i s  problem 
and has been maintaining close surveillance over it. 
LOAN REPAYMENTS AND INTERFAST 
ROKG payments of principal t o  AID/W have not f a l l e n  due nor have KECOts 
payments of pr incipal  t o  the ROKG have become due. A s  of February 28, 1969, 
ROKG Had made three in t e res t  payments t o  AIDD i n  the t o t a l  amount of $63,745 
and KECO had made three i n t e r e s t  payments t o  the  ROKG i n  the  t o t a l  amount of 
KL01,985,428 ($364,233). In t e res t  payments made by KECO were deposited t o  
the "Foreign Loan Repayment Fund Special Accountt1 maintained i n  the  Bank of 
Korea. A l l  the  above in t e res t  payments were made on a timely basis.  
COUNTERPART FUNDS 
Project Agreement No. 9003, dated September 20, 1968, provided a release 
of Won 2.5 b i l l i o n  of counterpart funds t o  KECO. These funds, together with 
Won 4.1 b i l l i o n  from the ROKG General Account were t o  be u t i l i zed  a s  a cap i t a l  
subscription t o  KECO. The Won 2.5 b i l l i o n  (counterpart) was t o  be u t i l i zed  t o  
finance the  l o c a l  currency costs  pertaining t o  the  implementation of f ive  A I D  
development loan projects.  The Kinistry of Finance released the Won 2.5 b i l l i o n  
t o  the Korea Reconstruction Bank (KRB) on September 21, 1968. The KRB trans- 
ferred the Won 2.5 b i l l i o n  t o  KECOls regular demand account on November 2, 1968. 
Although we d id  not perform a de ta i led  review of the f i nanc ia l  records 
maintained f o r  counterpart funds, our review indicated t h a t  the  counterpart 
funds were used f o r  t h i s  project  and the  other four projects specif ied i n  
t he  ProAg i n  accordance with the  ProAg provieions. As of February 28, 1969, 
t h e  l o c a l  currency expenditures made by KECO i n  support of t h i s  project  
amounted t o  Won 1?2 b i l l 3  on (equivalent t o  $4.2 mill ion).  
KOREA EIECTRIC COMPANY 
SEOUL 'I'HERMAL POWER PLANT 
- 
AID b a n  No. 489-H-033 
SUMMARY OF STATUS OF UTTERS OF COMMITMENT 
AID Loan No. 489-H-032 
As of Februam 28. 1969 
Engineering se-rvices-authorized 
Disbursements 
Unliquidated belance 
- 
Construction contract-authorized 
Disbursements 
Unliquidat ed balance 
Commodities and construction materials-authorized 
Disbursements 
Unliquidated balance 
RECAPITULATION 
Letters of Commitment issued 
Disbursements 
Unliquidated balance 
EXHIBIT I 
ASSETS 
-
Uti l i ty  plant: 
Electric plant, net  
S t ree t  railway, net 
Net Ut i l i ty  Plant 
Other Property and Investments 
Current Aesets : 
Cash and deposits 
Accounts and notes receivable, net 
Hateriala and suppliea 
Advances and prepeyments 
Other 
Total Current Assets 
Deferred Charges and Hiscellaneous: 
Construction costs - NCS contracts 
Long-term loans receivable 
Other 
Total 
KOREA ELECTRIC COMPANY 
CONDENSED COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET 
Ae of December 31. 1967 & 1968 
(in X i U o n s  of Won) 
m PROPRIETARY CAPITAL AND LIABILITIES 
Proprietary Capital: 
129,950 Cornon stock 
- 
- property revaluation aurplua 
Legal and special  resenres 
129.950 (A) Unappropriated aurplus 
Total Proprietary Capital 
EXHIBIT I1 
Other I t e w  of Capital Nature: 
Dividends due ROKG 4,UO 5,781 
Contribution8 i n  a id  of construction 2;282 2 ; 6 a  
Total 6.422B.lrOl, 
Operating Reserve 123 361 
Long-Term Debt-Domestic 
11 11 0 -Foreign 
Total 
Current Liabilities: 
Loans and notes psyable 6,W3 13,736 
Accounts payable 972 1,772 
Accrued taxes 2,652 1,685 (D) 
Accrued in teres t  322 613 
Accrued dividends 538 1,887 
Other 
Total Current LiabiUt ies  
8791.1P1 
ll.776 20.884 
Deferred Credits and Misco~laneous: 
Advances from NCS construction 4,284 2,000 
Contract guarantees 84 85 
Other 
Total 
2.3923.587 
6,760 5,672 
TOTAL CAPITAL & LIABILITIES 109,096 151.942 (E) 
(A) Includes approximately W5.2 b i l l i on  i n  property revaluations 
recorded during 1968. 
(El) 0;tst.d on net u t i l i t y  plant, excluding construction i n  progress, 
at end of year. 
( C )  1968 increase includos W20 b i l l i on  stock dividend appropriated 
out of property revaluation surplus as  provided by the  Korea 
Electric Company Act. 
(D) Includes the estimated provision fo r  corporate income taxes i n  
the amount of W1.55 bi l l ion .  See footnote on Condensed 
Comparative Statement of Income and Unappropriated Surplus. 
(E) No pro.rision has been made fo r  the l i a b i l i t y  f o r  retirement 
pay which approximated W6.5 b i l l i on  a s  of Decomber 31, 1968. 
EXHIBIT I11 
KOREA EUCTRIC COMPANY 
CONDENSED COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF INCOME AND UNAPPROPRIATED SURPLUS 
For the  Years Ended December 31, 1967 & 1968 
( I n  Millions of Won) 
m 1968 
Elec t r i c  Dewtment  
Operating rovenues 
Gperating qxpenses 
N v t  Operating Income 
c (% of ~ e v e n u e s )  
S t ree t  Railway Dewrtment 
Operating revenues 
Operating expenses 
Net Operating Loss 
Net utility Operating Income 
Other income and (expenses), net  
Net Income Before Corporate Taxes 
(% cjf Tota l  Revenues) 
Corporate Income Taxes 
iVet Income 
(% of Tota l  ~ e v e n u e s )  
Unappropriated Surplus 
Balance, beginning of period 
Appropriations : 
Reserves 
Dividends 
Adjustments 
Nct Unappropriated Surplus 
Note: Net income as r e f l e c t e d  above d i f f e r s  from the  amount reported i n  
KECOts unaudited f inanc ia l  statements by t h e  amount of the  l i a b i l i t y  
f o r  c o r p r a t e  income taxes. 
KOREA EUCTRIC COMPANY 
SEOUL THERMAL POWER PLANT 
A I D  Loan No. 489-H-033 
Description 
Domestic Long-term Debt: 
- Foreign Long-term Debt: 
A I D  b a n  
U.S.A. 
Japan 
W. Germany 
France 
I t a l y  
Panama 
England 
SOURCE OF LONG-TERM DEBT 
KOREA EUCTRIC COMPANY 
A s  of December 31. 1968 
( In  Thousands of Dollars) 
Total Foreign Debt 
To,tal Foreign & 
Domestf c Debt 
Foreign Loans i n  Process 
( ~ o t  yet approved by AID) 
Loan Amount Loan Principal Loan 
Authorization Disbursed Repayment Balance 
K O W A  E I E C T R I C  COMPJU 
SEOUL THERMAL POWER PLANT 
E X H I B I T  V 
A I D  Loan No. 489-H-0z 
D I S T R I B U T I O N  O F  REFORT 
No.  of 
C o p i e s  
USAID/K 
D i r e c t  o r  
D e p u t y  D i r e c t o r  
AD/DL 
I E D  
L;EG 
I IS/K 
C&R 
Auditor-in4harge:Darrell L. D o l l e y  
AID/W 
C/AUD 
EA/NEA 
. EA/PMCA 
EA/CDF 
w 
EXHIBIT V I  
REPORT CONTENT DATA 
(1) Activi ty  ident i f ica t ion  
Capital  Assistance 
A I D  b a n  No. 489-H-033 
(2) Value audited 
Dollar ( i n  millions ) 
Local Currency (in mil l ion - 
do l l a r  equivalent ) 
(3 ) Man-mont hs expended on audi t  
American 
Local 
